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Abstract: With the development of information technology, films, music, and other publications
are inclined to be distributed in digitalized form. However, the low cost of data replication
and dissemination leads to digital rights problems and brings huge economic losses. Up to now,
existing digital rights management (DRM) schemes have been powerless to deter attempts of
infringing digital rights and recover losses of copyright holders. This paper presents a YODA-based
digital watermark management system (Y-DWMS), adopting non-repudiation of smart contract
and blockchain, to implement a DRM mechanism to infinitely amplify the cost of infringement and
recover losses copyright holders suffered once the infringement is reported. We adopt game analysis
to prove that in Y-DWMS, the decision of non-infringement always dominates rational users, so as to
fundamentally eradicate the infringement of digital rights, which current mainstream DRM schemes
cannot reach.
Keywords: digital rights management; smart contract; blockchain; game theory
1. Introduction
Digital publishing adopts a binary form to perform the storage and distribution of common
publications (videos, music, images, etc.). Digital publications are valid without physical carriers of
information, compared with common publications, which leads to a low cost of edition, replication,
and distribution. However, this also invokes tough problems of digital rights management (DRM) [1].
For example, the film Wandering Earth released in China this year lost more than 140 million box office
dollars during the first week of its release, due to unauthorized spreading of film copies.
DRM issues are diverse and complex, but we believe that the essence of digital copyright is value
exchanging between copyright holders and users, while the essence of infringement is the imbalance
between the profit of copyright holders and the value obtained by users. Then, infringers may perform
infringement of copyright at any link in the flow of value. According to the common means infringers
may take, the threat model in DRM could be defined as follows:
• An infringer obtains the copy of publication, refusing to pay copyright holders enough.
Such scenarios include stealing a copy of publication, accessing it free via a third party,
or purchasing it for less than the copyright holder’s price, etc.
• An agent refuses to pay enough to the copyright holders. Such scenarios include unauthorized
agency and spreading, or concealment of all or partial sales volume by authorized agents, etc.
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Infringers must somehow obtain a copy of the publication before launching any of these attacks.
We have listed approaches for an infringer to obtain copies:
• Cracking keys. The infringer could try to steal or crack the decryption key for a copy by various
means. But as cryptography improves, it is obviously costly.
• Screen recording. The infringer could directly obtain copies of audio, video, and images via
screen recording or I/O monitoring. Defending such approaches technically seems expensive.
• Purchasing. The infringer could obtain a copy from the publisher by purchasing it. This approach
is completely unstoppable, as the act itself is legal.
Once a copy of publication is obtained, the infringer may take profit that would otherwise belong
to the copyright holder by selling the copy. The whole attack process is shown in Figure 1.
Publication
Purchase
Screen Recording
I/O Monitoring
Decryption
Data Access Unauthorized 
Spreading
Figure 1. The threat model in digital rights management (DRM).
Existing mainstream or novel DRM mechanisms include but are not limited to
encapsulated encryption and confusion [2–5], digital watermarks [6–14], blockchain [15,16],
trusted computing [17,18], biological features [19], etc. After reviewing the previous schemes,
we believe that existing DRM technologies still have great defects. According to the threat model and
schemes mentioned above, we address some of the following challenges:
• How can we ensure that users do not actively share copies or keys? What is the methodology?
• How can we ensure that copyright holders will not bear any losses, even if users divulge copies
through various means?
• How can we ensure the settlement of punishment and reward is immediate and non-repudiated?
Considering that users are selfish and greedy but rational, we try to form a competitive
environment among users and amplify the cost of infringement through games. Taking advantage
of the non-repudiation of smart contracts and blockchain and existing schemes related to copyright
protection, we designed Y-DWMS, a YODA-based digital watermark management system.
The core idea of Y-DWMS is: under the assumption that the users are selfish and greedy but
sensible, Y-DWMS infinitely amplifies the cost of infringement and rewards infringement informers in
a timely manner, so as to introduce competition of interests and destroy trust among users, forcing users
to opt for non-infringement and the protection of copies or keys from being cracked as a dominate
decision. The design of Y-DWMS determines that users cannot bear the cost of divulging keys or
copies. Technically, rewards and punishments under Y-DWMS are instantly settled and undeniable,
and losses copyright holders suffer could be recovered at the moment the infringement is reported.
Compared with schemes mentioned above and in Section 2, the copyright holders under Y-DWMS
do not bear any losses, the informers can always get timely rewards, and the punishments of the
infringers are magnified to infinity.
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1.1. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose Y-DWMS, a digital watermarking management system based on a public
smart contract platform. We summarize the contributions of the paper as follows:
• Y-DWMS can effectively recover losses of copyright holders and track infringers, reward informers,
and punish infringers at the moment of reporting, compared with [4,5,15,17,19,20].
• In the common smart contract platform, the punishment of infringers could be compensated
by informers if there are malicious smart contracts signed between infringers and informers.
However, Y-DWMS could resist that, compared with common smart contract platforms like [20].
• We adopt game theory to prove that Y-DWMS can increase the cost of copyright infringement to
infinity and resist countermeasures by signing smart contracts. Therefore, under the deterrence of
Y-DWMS, the decision of non-infringement always dominates rational users.
• Y-DWMS is independent from unique hardware, is flexible, and has weak restrictions on
distribution of copies, compared with [4,5,17,19].
1.2. Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we introduce representative related work and make comparisons with our scheme.
In Section 3, we define the model of Y-DWMS, introduce YODA, a smart contract computing method
suitable for computation-intensive contracts (CIC), and focus on the definition of system smart contracts
in Y-DWMS. In Section 4, we prove that Y-DWMS could significantly amplify the cost of infringement,
by adopting game analysis. In Section 5, we give the points that are still worth further discussion,
and in Section 6, we give the conclusion of this paper.
2. Background
In this section, we organize and briefly introduce previous works on DRM and make comparisons
between novel, representative schemes and Y-DWMS. The results of comparisons are in Table 1.
We also propose the main technical solution of our scheme.
Table 1. Comparison of different schemes and our YODA-based digital watermark management
system (Y-DWMS).
Y-DWMS Abdalla Mohamed Barbareschi Lee Ma Hasan
et al. [5] et al. [4] et al. [17] et al. [19] et al. [15] et al. [20]
Heavy cost of infringe-
ment
√ × × × × × ×
Recovery of copyright
losses
√ × × × × × ×
Undeniable reward and
punishment
√ × × × × × ×
Tracking traitors
√ × √ √ √ √ √
Screen record prevention
√ × × × × √ ×
Independent from uni-
que hardware
√ √ √ × × √ √
2.1. Related Work
2.1.1. DRM Based on Various Encryption Techniques
The most extensively applied DRM scheme could be AACS [3], adopting many ideas like novel
key encryption management, one-device-one-key, key revocation by copyright holders, and traitor
tracking based on a digital watermark. Recent DRM schemes represented by Abdalla et al. [5],
which are based on proxy re-encryption, address better key management in DRM schemes and can
tolerate a semi-honest third party for key management. Mohamed et al. [4] improved the distribution
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of digital publications based on joint fingerprint decryption (JFD), and in this DRM system, each
copy of the publication is encrypted differently and can only be decrypted using the corresponding
purchaser key. This mechanism enhances data’s unavailability to third parties. However, even if the
encryption schemes mentioned above are secure, they do not prevent users from illegally distributing
copies by actively sharing their keys. Such problems are obvious in [5], and the scheme proposed in [4]
fails to stop the spreading of a divulged key at the moment of its divulgence, although the scheme is
claimed to be anti-collusive and traceable to traitors.
2.1.2. DRM Based on Trusted Computing
In order to avoid complex key management and the unreliability of keys, some trusted computing
schemes are proposed. Barbareschi et al. [17] proposed DRM system applicable to android mobile
devices based on a trusted hardware core, and bind data availability to hardware; Lee et al. [19]
improved DRMS based on biological features to bind data availability to a user’s fingerprint. These
schemes prevented the sharing of keys, which cannot be banned by common encryption methods,
and enhanced the identity-based availability of data. However, these schemes lack flexibility. Firstly,
an infringer takes various approaches to illegally obtain copies, such as screen recording or I/O
monitoring, or multiple people sharing a trusted device. These schemes are not defensible against such
attacks. Secondly, these schemes require unique hardware, and many devices (partial PC, cable TV,
etc.) currently do not support fingerprint collection or trusted platform module (TPM), which limits
the generalization of the schemes above and increases costs.
2.1.3. DRM Based on Blockchain and Watermarking
Some people believe that protecting digital copyright by restricting the availability of copies could
always be defective, and many schemes have been proposed to enhance the tracking of digital copyright
infringement. Most of such schemes adopt the digital watermark as a basic technique to embed digital
signatures in publications. Figure 2 shows the workflow of digital watermarking. The DRM system
represented by the scheme proposed by Ma et al. [15] embeds information, including the identities of
purchasers, into digital copies and manages it with blockchain, so as to solve the problem of screen
recording. The scheme proposed by Hasan et al. [20] adopts smart contracts to ensure the process of
trade between untrusted users and novel techniques like IPFS [21] to ensure the integrity of digital
assets. However, the limitations of such schemes still remain. Firstly, the drawback of not being able
to prevent the offline spread of the divulged copies still exist. Secondly, independently collecting
evidence by platform could be difficult, but the users’ motivation for reporting is not well enhanced as
such schemes lack an effective punishment and reward mechanism. As a result, the scheme mentioned
above is powerless to track the traitor in a timely manner. In addition, the scheme proposed in [20]
cannot resist the countermeasure of signing a smart contract between the infringer and informer,
which eliminates the punishment the infringer deserves.
Watermark
embedding
Recovery
Public Key/
Secret Key
Original Copy Watermarked Copy Original Copy
Confidence Measure
Figure 2. The workflow of digital watermarking.
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2.2. Our Solutions
After reviewing previous schemes, we believe that existing DRM technologies still have great
defects. Considering that users are selfish and greedy, but rational, we try to form a fierce competitive
environment among users and amplify the cost of infringement through games. Taking advantage of
the non-repudiation of smart contracts, non-tampering of blockchain, and existing schemes related to
copyright protection, we designed Y-DWMS according to following ideas.
• In order to prevent users from sharing encryption keys or accounts, we use a public wallet key for
users to control the copy encryption and account login, trying to bind key and account safety to
the property safety of users, which amplifies the cost infinitely.
• In order to secure digital rights under the worst condition where an infringer has divulged the copy,
a punishment and reward mechanism based on smart contracts is designed to verify watermarks
in the divulged copy, authenticate the informer’s report, trace the infringer, perform punishment,
reward informers, and recover losses the copyright holders suffered.
3. Our Scheme
In this section, we propose a model of Y-DWMS based on the threat model above and our strategy,
attempting to achieve an effective game-theoretical copyright management system. Before elaborating
on Y-DWMS, we give some definitions and symbols that will be used in future designs.
3.1. Definitions
3.1.1. Symbols
As shown in Table 2, we give symbols and their meanings. These symbols will appear in
following descriptions.
Table 2. Symbols and meanings in the protocol.
Symbols and Their Meanings
R Request package generated by user
CR Smart contract corresponds with R.
ES = {N1, N2, N3. . . } A small pseudo-random set of executions where miners execute
CR independently, ES is redefined after each round of MIRACLE.
O = {T1, T2, T3. . . } Result set, saving results of each round of MIRACLE execution.
The final result of CR is selected from O.
AN Anchor node for the communication between ES and ¬ES
N Miners
T Tetrad of result
SigN Signature of miner N
S&R (seed(j,Φ), root(σ∗)), representing result of RICE.
3.1.2. YODA: Enabling Computationally Intensive Contracts
The execution of some computationally intensive contracts (CICs) is extremely expensive,
which prevents us from performing digital watermarks and complex encryption algorithms at low
gas costs on smart contract platforms like Ethereum. Selecting a small set of miners performing the
calculation of contracts could reduce costs, but it does not guarantee credibility of the execution.
Sourav Das et al. proposed YODA [22], a method for deploying CICs on Ethereum. YODA proposed
a novel multi-round adaptive consensus using likelihood estimation (MIRACLE) algorithm based
on a sequence hypothesis test to execute the smart contract: a quite small number of miners are
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pseudo-randomly selected to form an execution set ES, in which each miner executes the contract
separately to perform a single round calculation. MIRACLE executes CICs through multiple round
iterations in different ES each round and decides the result through likelihood estimation. This paper
also proposed a novel randomly inserted contract execution (RICE) algorithm to force miners to
perform CICs correctly. RICE’s logic is as follows:
Initialization. Ψ is a smart contract operating on a state denoted as σ, taking x as input. Ψ(σ, x)
outputs a new state denoted as σ∗. Denote root(σ) as a hash digest of σ and j as a round number
MIRACLE has executed. In order to ensure that the pseudo-random abstracts are generated in each
round without breaking the mapping relationship between them, RICE generates a digest denoted as
(seed(j, .), root), in which seed(j, .) is generated like:
seed(j,0) ←
{
RandomGen () if j = 1,
hash (seed (j−1,0)) otherwise.
CIC Execution. Considering the machine instruction sequence of a smart contract as a vector,
RICE updates seed at a pseudo-random position of this vector. Denote the state when updating seed as
σ′; RICE updates seed like:
seed(j,l+1) ← hash
(
seed(j,l) ‖ root (σ′))
This ensures that each round of CIC execution generates a different digest.
Result Submission. After execution, miners in ES submit (seed(j,Φ), root(σ∗)) via a consensus
protocol, where φ is the number of seed updates. Seed generated by honest miners should be the same
in a round but different between rounds. Dishonest execution leads to mismatching between root
and digest.
Although YODA is not directly reflected in the contract logic of Y-DWMS, as scheme for Y-DWMS
to execute smart contracts, YODA not only enables smart contracts to perform computationally
intensive calculations such as digital watermarks at low cost, but also ensures that it is difficult for
adversaries to collude with miners to carry out wrong results. We could isolate, trace, and punish
the malfunctioning miners in time. Chainspace [23], proposed by Al-Bassam et al. is a smart contract
infrastructure that can implement YODA well. The mapping requests to ES and the isolation of
malfunctioning miners are implemented by the system smart contract.
Here, we formalize the interaction process of YODA:
Propose. User generates request package R, and submits it to AN. AN broadcasts R to the
whole network.
Generate ES. Pseudo-randomly chosen miner Ni joins ES, which makes ES={Ni | i =
SysContract.RandomSelection(R)}.
Execution. For each Ni∈ES, independently execute CR, generating (R, CR, SigNi , S&Ri).
Consensus In ES. For each Ni ∈ ES, broadcast TNi = (R, CR, SigNi , S&RNi ) to other miners in ES.
ES reaches TES through a consensus protocol like PBFT. Broadcast TES to ¬ES. Generate new ES’ and
re-execute CR.
Verification & Serialization. ¬ES maintains O = {T1, T2, . . . } and determines the final result
from O using likelihood estimation. ¬ES serializes the result and sends feedback to ES to terminate
the calculation.
3.1.3. Pivotal Contracts
Specifically, the basic function of Y-DWMS is implemented through pivotal smart contracts.
After receiving requests, a node’s core module processes the request and executes one of the following
contracts. In Y-DWMS, there are two pivotal smart contracts:
Publish. This contract is released when copyright holders decide to publish a publication and
is invoked when a user applies to purchase a copy. A user transfers a specific amount of deposit to
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this contract’s account, submitting a request meanwhile. After verification of the signature, a user’s
account will be added to a list, the users in which have already paid for the copy. Copyright holders
can inspect the current status of the list, embed their signatures and the user’s signature to each copy,
and distribute it to the related user. If the copyright holders decide to destroy the contract, the deposit
stored in this contract will be settled to the copyright holders, and the process of publishing will be
terminated. This contract’s logic is as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Contract_Publish
1: Var:
2: {account, cp_holder, customer:Address; paid_list:Address list;}
3:
4: Func_Purchase():
5: if exists transaction{customer->account, amount=deposit} then
6: paid_list.add(customer)
7: else
8: reject and fallback
9: end if
10:
11: Func_Distribute(publication):
12: publication<-Watermark(publication, customer.SK, cp_holders.SK)
13: publication<-Encrypt(publication, customer.PK)
14: paid_list.remove(customer)
15: return publication
16:
17: Func˜:
18: if paid_list is NULL then
19: account.transfer(cp_holder, amount)
20: destroy
21: else
22: reject and fallback
23: end if
Report. This contract is released when copyright holders decide to publish a publication and is
invoked when a user reports an infringement. After a user transfers a deposit to Contract_Publish,
and before further processes, the copyright holder should ask the user to transfer a specific amount of
deposit to this contract. An informer submits a copy, which is purchased and divulged by an infringer,
and a parameter X to this contract, and if the infringer’s watermark is detected, this contract will
transfer a deposit of X to the informer and deposit copyright holders deserve to copyright holders.
The logic of this contract is as Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Contract_Report
1: Var:
2: {account, cp_holder, customer, informer:Address; X, price:Number; pub:Binary;}
3:
4: Func_Report():
5: confidence<-WatermarkVerify(customer.PK, cp_holder.PK, pub)
6: if confidence is True then
7: if X+price<=account.deposit then
8: account.transfer(informer, X)
9: account.transfer(cp_holder, price)
10: X<-0
11: else
12: X<-X-account.deposit
13: account.transfer(cp_holder, price)
14: account.transfer(informer, account.deposit)
15: end if
16: else
17: reject and fallback
18: end if
19:
20: Func˜:
21: if X is 0 then
22: account.transfer(customer, account.deposit)
23: destroy
24: else
25: reject and fallback
26: end if
3.2. System Modeling
Y-DWMS takes a distributed network as its infrastructure, and each node runs three modules:
a ledger module, a core module, and a contract module. In the case that the number of adversarial
nodes meets the worst case, 3 f + 1 < n, an appropriate consensus protocol guarantees the final
consistency of each node state. The system overview is shown in Figure 3.
The ledger module is a distributed blockchain ledger that stores a history of operations, records
of purchasing, using, and downloading, as well as payment and contract records between users. As the
attribute of the blockchain, transactions cannot be modified once they are serialized on the blockchain.
The core module is the module responsible for sharing and contract execution. In this module,
we deploy the entire YODA algorithm to manage the status of contracts. Nodes are required to have
high integrity. Every node newly added to the network must accept the integrity inspection from other
nodes through the consensus protocol, and other nodes decide admission independently according to
the integrity of new nodes.
The contract module manages all smart contracts and invokes them according to a user’s request,
controlled by the core module. The smart contract takes requests as input, operates on a contract’s
status, and provides feedback to the corresponding user. The smart contract implements business
logic, and its ideal scripting language is with Turing completeness. The execution of a smart contract
is atomic.
Requests are generated by users to interact with the platform. Users define various key–value
pairs in a set of requests to express business logic to the platform. The platform classifies the requests,
calls the corresponding smart contracts to process user requests, and serializes transactions on the
ledger. The data structure of a request is as follows:
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typedefine < type >: Request{
sponsor id: Id list,
signature: Sign(sponsor id) list,
timestamp: Timestamp,
note: String,
aribitrary: {< key: Arbitrary >:< value: Arbitrary >}
}
Figure 3. System architecture of Y-DWMS.
Interaction
We will present the full workflow and process of interaction step by step. The interaction of
Y-DWMS is as simple as the common smart contract platforms like Ethereum: copyright holders
release smart contracts to gather and manage deposits from users, and deposits will be transferred to
specific accounts if specific transactions occur. The process of interaction is presented in Figure 4.
Copyright Holders Contract_Publish
Contract_Report
User
Informer
+ Watermark
+ Watermark
+ Watermark+X
=X
① 
② 
③ 
④ 
⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ 
⑨ ⑩ 
⑪ ⑫ 
Figure 4. Process of interaction of Y-DWMS.
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• Step 1©: The copyright holders release Contract_Publish and store publication to this contract.
• Step 2©: A user who decides to purchase stores deposits to this contract.
• Step 3©: Contract_Publish returns a copy of the publication embedded with copyright holder and
user watermarks.
• Step 4©: When Contract_Publish is destroyed, copyright holders receive a deposit.
• Step 5©: Meanwhile, copyright holders release Contract_Report, which is aimed to the user,
and ask the user to store a deposit to this contract.
• Step 6©: The user stores a deposit to this contract.
• Step 7©: The user divulges the copy by selling it to an informer.
• Step 8©: The informer pays for the divulged copy.
• Step 9©: The informer reports the infringement by submitting the copy and parameter X to
Contract_Report.
• Step 10©: If a watermark is detected in the copy and verified by Contract_Report, the informer will
get a deposit, the amount of which is X.
• Step 11©: Meanwhile, copyright holders will get the deposit they deserve from publishing
the publication.
• Step 12©: If there is no infringement during a period that copyright holders consider appropriate,
the deposit will be returned to the user.
4. Analysis Combining Game Theory
Game theory is an important theoretical tool, supporting many solutions like those in [24]. In this
section, we sort out all possible means of infringement and prove the incredible cost that the infringer
needs to bear through game analysis. We find that in a full game, no infringement always dominates
a user’s decision.
4.1. Copyright Offense by Colluding with Miners: Game Theoretical Dangerous
According to YODA’s design, an adversary needs to calculate the ES of each round of execution
before submitting an illegal request and force a significant number of miners in each ES to perform the
wrong calculation. If this fails, the request is rejected, and the miner will be isolated at a cost considered
to be −∞. The MIRACLE and RICE algorithms ensure that the processing of a request is repeated for
multiple rounds by multiple random ES, and the calculation process cannot be forged. The feasibility
and security of YODA were respectively proved [22], so we can assume that the probability of attack
failure β is close to 1. The value of the publication is denoted as v, the number of miners in ES is
denoted as n, and the cost of controlling a miner is expressed as c. Then the profit expectation of this
process is
Ex = lim
β→1
v− β∞− (1− β)nc = −∞.
If copyright payment is regarded as value exchange, we can assume that the user’s profit in this
process is 0. The user’s profit matrix can be obtained:
Non-infringement Infringement
0 limβ→1v− β∞− (1− β)nc
Obviously, in this single-player static game, non-infringement decision forms dominance.
Therefore, performing copyright infringement via collusion with miners is almost impossible, such
an attempt is also extremely costly.
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4.2. Copyright Offense via Sharing Publication Copy: Game Theoretical Dangerous
One common way to circumvent Y-DWMS and other DRM schemes is to share copies outside the
jurisdiction of the platform. Assuming that the infringer has already obtained and divulged copies
through screen recording or I/O listening, the following subgame is introduced.
In the game presented in Figure 5, the player set contains all users and the copyright holder,
i.e., N = {holder, C1, C2,. . . , Ck}. For each user Ck, the action set is A = s ∧ r, ¬ s ∧ r, s ∧ ¬ r, ¬ s ∧
¬ r, in which selling copies is denoted as s, and reporting is denoted as r. To simplify the analysis,
we firstly assume that each user is allowed to perform selling copies only once, and the copyright
holder’s profit will not be discussed in figures (we will discuss these respectively). We denote the
profit function of Ck as uk.
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Figure 5. The subgame will be triggered if a digital copy is divulged.
Next, we perform the analysis of this game. According to the contract design of Y-DWMS,
this game adopts the following rules:
• If Ck launches s, then the profit of Ck increases by vk, and the profit of Ck+1 increases by –vk. vk is
the price for selling divulged copies.
• If Ck launches r, then the profit of Ck increases by b, the profit of C1 increases by –b–v, and the
profit of the copyright holder increases by v. b is the reward for Ck, and v is original price of
the publication.
If N is an infinite set, i.e., the number of users is large enough, the deposit the infringer transferred
to the contract is sufficient, and b > vk−vk+1, then the whole game will form a unique sequential
dominance. For C2, C3, . . . , Ck, the choice of s∧r will always bring the highest profit, and the dominance
sequence will always be the leftmost route of the game tree. This game ideally will not terminate since
N is an infinite set.
Formally, we have the followings:
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If N is an infinite set, the balance of the user’s account is sufficient and b > vk−vk+1, then the
subgame in the figure will perform a unique sequential equilibrium
Ex = lim
k→+∞
(s1, s2, . . . , sk), (b1, b2, . . . , bk),
where 
s1 = ([1(Divulge Copy)])
s2 = ([1(s ∧ r), 0(¬s ∧ r), 0(s ∧ ¬r), 0(¬s ∧ ¬r)])
s3 = ([1(s ∧ r), 0(¬s ∧ r), 0(s ∧ ¬r), 0(¬s ∧ ¬r)])
. . .
sk = ([1(s ∧ r), 0(¬s ∧ r), 0(s ∧ ¬r), 0(¬s ∧ ¬r)])
b1 = ([1(v0)])
b2 = ([1(v1)])
b3 = ([1(v2), 0(v3), 0(v4), 0(v5)])
b4 = ([0(v6), 1(v7), 0(v8), 0(v9)])
b5 = ([1(v14), 0(v15), 0(v16), 0(v17)])
. . .
bk = ([1(vl2), 0(vl1), 0(vr1), 0(vr2)]).
Under this equilibrium, the profit of C1 is
Uti(C1) = lim
k→∞
v′ − k(b + v) = −∞
when the profit of copyright holder is
Uti(Holder) = lim
k→∞
kv.
Obviously, the cost of C1 is incredible, while the copyright holder suffered no loss.
Based on this subgame, the benefit of the infringer divulging the key is easy to calculate: instead
of generating additional positive profit for C1, it adds negative revenue –c–p, where c is the property
loss C1 needs to suffer, and p is the losses generated by other users stealing C1’s identity. Based on the
previous profit analysis of various attack means, we could perform the full game in Figure 6:
𝑉0 
𝑉1 
𝑉2 𝑉3 𝑉4 
Full game In Y-DWMS
Share 
NAN 
 
0
0
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𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 
𝐶1 
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0
−∞
  
PK 
Subgame
 
0
−∞
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0
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0
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Figure 6. The full game in Y-DWMS. Sharing copies will always trigger the subgame.
Sensors 2019, 19, 3091 13 of 17
In the full game, the player set contains all users and the copyright holder, i.e., N = {holder, C1,
C2, . . . , Ck}. The action set of C1 is A = {Atk, CP, PK, NAN}, where Atk is a direct attack on Y-DWMS,
CP is the divulged copy, PK is divulged public key of C1, NAN is nothing to do. The action set of C2 is
A’ = {t ∧ v, ¬ t ∧ v, t ∧ ¬ v, ¬ t ∧ ¬ v}, where t is stealing C1’s balance, and v is stealing C1’s identity.
To simplify the analysis, we only discuss the profit of the copyright holder and C1, and the matching
profit function is u0, u1. According to the design of contracts, the full game adopts new rules on the
basis of a subgame:
• If C2 launches t, then the profit of C1 increases by –c, profit of C2 increases by c.
• If C2 launches v, then profit of C1 increases by –p.
According to our game analysis of the infringer launching an attack on Y-DWMS, the profit of
C1 launching Atk is −∞. No matter whether C1 launches CP or PK, the subgame will be triggered.
More importantly, launching PK generates additional negative profit. It is obvious that we have
the following:
If the full game satisfies the conditions satisfied by the subgame, then a unique sequential
equilibrium will form, where
s1 = ([1(Share)])
s2 = ([0(Atk), 0(CP), 0(PK), 1(NAN)])
b1 = ([1(v0)])
b2 = ([1(v1)]).
Under this equilibrium, the profit of C1 is 0 when the profit of the copyright holder is still
limk→∞kv.
4.3. Countering Punishment via Smart Contract: Impossible
There is a fatal weakness in traditional smart contract schemes that an infringer could adopt to
eliminate punishment, by forcing users to sign a smart contract before purchasing copies from the
infringer. We denote this as Contract_Countermeasure. If the copies are submitted to the platform
and the infringer’s watermark is detected, this contract is triggered to transfer a huge amount of
compensation to the infringer, which is denoted as cmp. Thus, if the infringement is reported,
the informer will suffer heavy losses. The contract’s logic is simply presented as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Contract_Contermeasure
1: Var:
2: {account, infringer, informer:Address;}
3:
4: Func_Contermeasure():
5: if exists transaction{Contract_Report->informer, amount=deposit} then
6: account.transfer(infringer, deposit)
7: else
8: reject and fallback
9: end if
10:
11: Func˜:
12: destroy
Under a contract like this, the subgame mentioned above will be changed as in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. The subgame mentioned above will be changed like this under Contract_Countermeasure.
However, in Y-DWMS, informers can counter it simply. As an informer reward request is
a secret parameter that the infringer will never correctly predict, this contract cannot know the
exact loss the infringer will suffer. The compensation to the infringer must be settled when
Contract_Countermeasure is signed, so the informer could simply increase the reward request,
making sure that b > v′ + cmp. As a result, the domain decision will switch to b ∧ c, maintaining the
original subgame and full game.
4.4. Summary
Analysis above proves that in Y-DWMS, losses infringer suffers through common methods of
copyright infringement could always be unbearable, and the copyright holder does not bear any
loss. Under the control of smart contracts, the settlement of profit is instantaneous and undeniable.
This minimizes the influence of psychological factors on user’s decision. Under the condition of
complete information, rational and self-interested users will make efforts to protect the copies they
occupied from being stolen, and steal keys and copies of others. Therefore, a fierce competition is
introduced among users. We also introduced a counter contract which is effective in common smart
contract platform, and proved that such countermeasure is ineffective in Y-DWMS.
5. Discussions
Y-DWMS integrates the advantages of various current anti-infringement schemes, with a simple
structure and implementation. However, as Y-DWMS is still in an early stage of development,
by combining smart contracts with digital watermarks, there are some security issues that need
to be addressed and optimized [25]. Before Y-DWMS becomes an effective system, the following
security issues need to be discussed in depth:
Account Security. Admittedly, the credible and efficient game environment provided by Y-DWMS
can effectively restrain infringement in advance in a flexible way, but this environment is built on the
basis of secured accounts. If malicious users crack other users’ keys or copies through technical means,
the stolen users will bear the risk of gaming, and the proof and traceability of such an infringement is
extremely difficult. Therefore, the effective premise of Y-DWMS is that the user’s account security is
fully guaranteed.
Loopholes in Ethereum. The design of Y-DWMS is succinct and clear, so it will not bring about
fatal system loopholes to the scheme. However, practically, there are still security issues that need to
be considered.
Security issues are obvious on common smart contract platforms, Ethereum being a representation.
Ethereum is facing security threats including but not limited to loopholes caused by less rigorously
programmed smart contracts, DAO loopholes. The model of Y-DWMS relies on an ideal smart contract
platform, and without fixing the loopholes mentioned above, the effectiveness of Y-DWMS will decay.
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However, a methodology of securing network infrastructure and the smart contract platform could be
a tough task.
Security Issues with Digital Watermarks. Y-DWMS adopts ideal digital watermark algorithms,
which is robust: even if watermarks are damaged or compressed to an extent, the algorithms could
still detect and verify watermarks. This puts forward higher requirements for digital watermark
algorithms. Many digital watermark algorithms are claimed to be perfect in their performance, but the
robustness, efficiency, and implementation difficulty of such algorithms have yet to be proved.
Privacy. Most smart contract applications, including Y-DWMS, face privacy issues, as there
are conflicts between privacy demand and the transparency of blockchain and smart contracts.
In Ethereum, anyone could inspect the current status of smart contracts, which also contains
information about personal consumption. As for Y-DWMS, the informer could inspect the contract
status to access history of consumption, which should have been private. An effective access
control system on smart contracts plays a significant role in solving the conflicts mentioned above.
Deploying Y-DWMS on a smart contract platform like Hyperledger, which has a better access control
system, should be considered.
6. Conclusions
In order to address the divulgence of digital publication copies and immediate compensation of
losses copyright holders suffer, in this paper, we proposed Y-DWMS, a YODA-based digital watermark
management system, to counter the mainstream illegal distribution of publications. The main
conclusions are as follows:
• Adopting smart contracts and digital watermarks could form a game between infringers and
informers, as divulged copies are embedded with the signatures of infringers, and informers
could get profit from infringers by submitting signed divulged copies to smart contracts.
Losses copyright holders suffer could also be recovered by smart contract.
• Game analysis has proved that the game mentioned above could theoretically amplify the cost of
infringement to infinity, under the condition that the deposit of the infringer is sufficient, as the
distribution of the divulged copy is unstoppable among an infinite set of users under such a game
environment.
• Game analysis has also proved that the punishment infringers deserve could not be recovered by
signing smart contracts, as the logic of Contract_Report makes infringers never know how much
deposit will finally lose.
Y-DWMS theoretically prevents digital rights infringement fundamentally, with high flexibility,
efficiency, and credibility. We need to consider implementing a secure smart contract platform as
an important future work, as Y-DWMS takes such a platform as the basis of its effectiveness. We believe
that Y-DWMS provides new thinking for further research on solving digital copyright issues.
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